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"Don'ts" for Finance Companies 
By E. E. BERGMANN, New York Thirty-ninth Street Office 
W ITH the undertaking of each new engagement, the accountant starts 
out in the hope that the assignment will 
be one in which his technical and practical 
knowledge may prove to be of material aid 
to the client. But too often the engage-
ment seems to be lacking in subject-matter 
which may be explored and developed with 
advantage to the client, and without too 
great an expense of time. 
An engagement covering an examination 
of the accounts of a finance company, to 
which the writer was assigned, proved to 
be Utopian with respect to such oppor-
tunity, inasmuch as it disclosed practices 
and policies which almost precluded the 
company from the possibility of being able 
to operate profitably, even though the 
accounting methods were practically ideal. 
Among these practices were a number 
which are summarized briefly herein, and 
which truly can be called a list of "don'ts" 
for finance companies. 
The company, first of all, agreed to 
finance the distributors of certain manu-
facturing companies without recourse to 
the distributors, or to the companies. This 
practice led to the acquisition, through 
repossessions, of used equipment for which 
the finance company could find no ready 
market. 
Second, the company advanced large 
sums to certain distributors on their notes 
which were to be liquidated in equal 
monthly payments. These notes were 
secured only by collateral purchase agree-
ments. This plan of financing gave the 
distributor a great leeway in making sales 
without regard to the credit risk of the pur-
chaser. It is only reasonable to suppose 
that in some instances a dealer, seeing the 
impossibility of meeting coming instal-
ments on his notes, would be tempted to 
make sufficient sales, without due regard 
for the credit risk, to enable him to obtain 
funds through down payments with which 
to satisfy his current indebtedness, and 
then to gamble more or less on the future, 
knowing that if he could pay his current 
debts he could secure further financing. 
Third, the company allowed dealers to 
make collections from the purchasers, in-
stead of having the purchasers remit direct 
to the finance company. This opened up 
several dangerous possibilities, chief among 
which was the withholding of collections 
by dealers. 
Fourth, the finance company, in accept-
ing new business, financed many dealers at 
remote points far from the control of the 
field force. Such dealers could withhold 
collections at will and could otherwise 
transact their business in such manner as 
to cause large monetary losses to the 
finance company. 
A finance company generally works on a 
slender margin of profit and must use every 
safeguard against possible losses. In mak-
ing audits of finance companies, the ac-
countant would do well to analyze thor-
oughly, and consider carefully, the funda-
mental policies and practices employed by 
the company in making loans, bearing in 
mind the points brought forth in this 
article as dangers to be guarded against 
in warding off huge potential losses. 
